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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.J .A.MES D. CHRISTENSEN AND 
BETTY CHRISTENSEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
HENRY CORDOVA, 
Defendant and Appellatnt. 
Case No. 
11752 
BRIEF O,F RESP·ONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiffs filed this action against defendant to re-
coYer damages for personal injuries and property 
damage. It is from the proceedings of the Court below 
tlrnt defendant appeals. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs filed their action against defendant for 
personal injury and property damage arising out of an 
automobile accident that occurred on the 24th of August, 
19G8. Defendant admitted liability and the issue of 
(bmages was tried to the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
1 
sitting without a jury. The trial court entered judgment 
in favor of plaintiff Betty Christensen and against de-
fendant for medical expenses in the sum of $998.29 and 
general damages in the sum of $5,000.00, and in favor of 
plaintiff James D. Christensen and against defendant 
for the following amounts: Medical expenses $232.50, 
property damage $393.64, and general damages in the 
sum of $750.00. 
The trial court refused to grant defendant a jury 
trial, and defendant appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondents seek to have the action of the trial 
court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order for the appellate court to fully understand 
what has transpired in this case from its initiation to 
the appeal, respondents will set out the facts in detail. 
On the 24th day of August, 1968, at the intersection 
of 2400 South Main, Bountiful, Davis County, Utah, 
defendant drove his car into the rear of an automobile 
owned and driven by plaintiff James D. Christensen, 
and in which his wife was riding as a passenger (R. 1, 
4). Both plaintiffs sustained bodily injury as a result 
of the accident, and Mr. Christensen's automobile was 
damaged. 
At the time of the accident, plaintiffs were insured 
under a policy of automobile liability insurance which 
2 
protected them against injury and damage from any 
uninsured motorist (R. 14). On August 30, 1968, plain-
tiffs employed Mr. Carman E. Kipp of the firm of Kipp 
and Christian to represent them in connection with filing 
snit against Mr. Cordova for the injury and damage sus-
taied by them in the accident (R. 13). Accordingly, suit 
·was filed in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
seeking damages for damage to plaintiffs' automobile 
aud for bodily injury to plaintiff Betty Christensen, for 
speeial medical and hospital expenses incurred and 
general damages in the sum of $10,000.00 (R. 2). De-
fendant retained attorney Eldred J. Wilde to represent 
him in defense of plaintiffs' action, and accordingly, an 
ans·\Cn'r \Vas filed in his behalf on October 1, 1968 (R. 4). 
On Odober 14, 1968, defendant, by and through his 
conusel of record, admitted that on the day of the auto-
mobile accident in question he was not insured under any 
policy of automobile liability insurance and was at that 
time an uninsured motorist within the definition of that 
term. A stipulation to that effect was filed by the parties 
and made part of the court file and the record in this 
rase (R. 5). 
On November 22, 1968, Carman E. Kipp, as counsel 
for plaintiffs, filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial re-
questing a non-jury trial and duly mailed a copy to 
J%lred J. \Vilde, counsel for defendant, at his office, 616 
.Judge Building, Salt Lake City (R. 7). Thereafter, on 
N" ovember 25, 1968, and presumably after he had re-
ceived plaintiffs' Notice of Readiness for Trial, Mr. 
\Vilde, defendant's counsel, filed his Withdrawal of 
') 
" 
Counsel which was received by the court on November 
26. A copy of the withdrawal was mailed to plaintiff's 
attorney on November 26 which was several days after 
the filing of the Notice of Readiness for Trial (R. 6, 7). 
The record in this matter shows that on March 20 1969 
' ' the District Court of Salt Lake County, Judge Aldon J. 
Anderson, set the matter for non-jury trial on June 24, 
1969. Copies of the letter setting the case for trial were 
sent to both l\lr. Kipp and l\lr. Wilde (R. 10). 
In September of 1968, Mr. Frank Nichols of Frank 
Xichols and Guiver Company, insurance adjusters, con-
tacted ::\Ir. Kipp, plaintiffs' counsel, and advised him 
that L. D. vVrigley of C. W. Reese Company, insur-
ance adjusters, 1vas the adjuster for Reserve Insurance 
Compan}T on the claim for bodily injury sustained by 
'both .Mr. and l\frs. Christensen under the uninsured 
motorist provisions of their automobile liability insur-
ance policy with that company (R. 14). Therefore, on 
September 13, 1968, Mr. Kipp wrote a letter to Mr. 
vVrigley advising him that an action had been filed by 
the Christensens against Mr. Cordova. The letter also 
advised the adjuster that Mr. Kipp was representing 
ResenTe Insurance Company's insureds, and copies of 
the Summons and Complaint were enclosed in the letter 
along with a list of medical bills and other specials for 
both plaintiffs incurred up to that itme (R. 14). 
On numerous occasions thereafter, Mr. Kipp con-
tacted .:\Ir. Wrigley or someone in the office of C. W. 
Reese Company advising them of the status of the law-
suit and furnishing them with up to date medical specials 
as ineurred by both plaintiffs and supplying them with 
cnrrent medical reports (R. 14). As a part of the con-
tirmous contact between Mr. Kipp and the adjuster, Mr. 
Wrigley, on behalf of the company, requested that both 
::\Ir. allcl :Mrs. Christensen submit to an independent 
medic·al examination by Dr. Reed Clegg. Accordingly, 
the plaintiffs were examined by Dr. Clegg and copies of 
the metlical report were sent to the adjuster. A copy of 
the stipulation between plaintiffs and defendant wherein 
Mr. Cordova admitted that he did not have automobile 
insurance at the time the accident occurred was 
sent to the adjuster (R. 14). 
On two occasions, Reserve Insurance Company, by 
and through its adjuster, requested that Mr. Kipp submit 
an off er of settlement on the claims of both plaintiffs. 
Offers to settle were submitted to the company pursuant 
to both requests, neither of which was accepted and with-
nnt any counter-offer having been made by the company 
(R.15). 
On or about June 18, 1969, Reserve Insurance Com-
employed Mr. L. E. :Midgley to represent defendant 
HemY Confo\'a because of the uninsured motorist pro-
\'i sion in the policy issued to plaintiffs, and on that day, 
::.rr. l\Iidgley filed a Demand and Motion for Jury Trial 
and mailed a copy of same to plaintiffs' attorneys. The 
::.Iotion for a Jury Trial was resisted by counsel for 
plaiHtiff who aclYised the presiding judge, Bryant Croft, 
of th0 matters essentially set forth in the statement of 
5 
facts herein. Plaintiffs' counsel was instructed to file 
his affidavit setting forth the facts as related at the 
hearing on the motion. The affidavit was filed (R. 13-
15), and the 1\f otion for a Jury Trial was denied on June 
23, 1969 (R. 12). Defendant did not file his counter 
affidavit to the assertions made by plainitff s' counsel 
as to what the facts were in this matter, nor did he re-
quest permission to file one. 
The case was tried on June 24, 1969, before the 
Honorable Stewart .M. Hanson, sitting without a jury. 
At the commencement of the trial, Mr. Midgley, counsel 
for the insurance company and defendant, admitted 
liability on the part of Mr. Cordova. Plaintiffs' counsel 
made a motion to include the bodily injury claim of plain-
tiff James D. Christensen for trial, which motion was 
granted over Mr. Midgley's objection (R. 17). 
Counsel for the insurance company and Mr. Cor-
dova <lid not call any witnesses at the trial b1;J.t contented 
himself with cross-examining plaintiffs' witnesses. Dr. 
Reed Clegg, who performed the independent medical 
examination on behalf of the insurance company, was 
not called by the company's counsel to reveal to the 
court his findings as to the nature and extent of the in-
juries of both plaintiffs. 
It is from the court's refusal to grant a jury trial 
m this action that Reserve Insurance Company prose-




THE JUDGMENT AND PROCEEDINGS 
IN THE LOWER COURT ARE PRESUMED 
TO BE CORRECT BY THE REVIEWING 
COURT ON APPEAL. 
The cases overwhelmingly support the general 
1•roposition of law stated in Point I., and especially as it 
avplies to the instant case. No cases have been found by 
respomlents stating a contrary position. 
Not only is there a presumption of validity on ap-
IJl·a l of the judgment and proceeding in the lower court, 
but the burden is on the appellant affirmatively to 
dC'monstrate error, and in the absence of such the judg-
ment must be affirmed by the reviewing court. Leithead 
c. Adair, 10 U.2d 282, 351 P.2d 956; Coombs v. Perry, 2 
U.2d 381, 275 P.2d 680. Again, on appeal the judgment 
of the trial court is presumptively correct and every rea-
sonable intendment must be indulged in by the appellate 
court in favor of it. Burton v. Zions Co-operative Mer-
cantile l11stitution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2d 514; Nagle v. 
Club Fontainblue, 17 U. 2d 125, 405 P.2d 346; Petty v. 
Oinrly Jlanufacturing Corporation, 17 U.2d 32, 404 P.2d 
30. 
This proposition of law is correct and is binding up-
011 the appellate court whether the proceedings in the 
1<>1Yer court are before a judge only or a judge and jury. 
Other cases supporting this proposition are Charl-
ton 1·. Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176; Universal In-
7 
restmeut Company v. Carpets, Inc., 16 U.2d 336, 400 P.2d 
364; Taylor 1:. Johnson, 15 U.2d 342, 398 P.2d 382; Wen-
dr:lboe v. Jacobson, 10 U.2d 344, 353 P.2d 178; Hadley v. 
TVood, 9 U.2d 366, 345 P.2d 197; Daisy Distributors, Inc., 
Local Union 976, Joint Council 67, 1¥ estern Conference 
(If Teamsters, 8 U.2d 124, 329 P.2d 414. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE 
ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFEN-
DANT A JURY TRIAL. 
Rule 38 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
as follows: 
''Any party may demand a trial by jury of 
any issue triable of right by a jury by paying the 
statutory jury fee and serving upon the other 
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time 
after the commencement of the action and not 
later than shall be fixed by rule of the court in 
-.,yhich the action is pending. Such demand may be 
endorsed upon a pleading of the party.'' 
This particular provision reserving the right to a 
trial of any issue triable of right by a jury not to he in 
conflict with the Constitution of the State of Utah, Ar-
ticle I, Sec. 10. State v. Cherry, 22 Utah 1, 60 Pac. 1103. 
It is obvious, then, that the failure of a party to pay 
the statutory jury fee and make his demand for a jury 
trial in accordance with the rules promulgated by the 
court where the action is pending constitutes a waiver 
hy that party of a trial by jury. Rule 38(d), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
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In the instant case, plaintiffs counsel filed a Notice 
of Headiness for Trial demanding that the matter be set 
for 11011-jury trial. A copy of said notice was duly mailed 
to Eldred .J. -Wilde at his office on November 22, 1968 
( R. 17). It is important to note that Mr. Wilde was still 
acting as defendant's attorney at that time. He did not 
file his withdrawal as counsel until November 25, 1968 
(R. 6). There can be no doubt that defendant was put 
on notice that plaintiff demanded a non-jury trial and 
certainly at that time he took no action to demand a jury 
trial. 
Subsequently, and on March 20, 1969, the District 
Court of Salt Lake County, the court in which the case 
\ms pending, sent notice to both parties by sending said 
notice to their respective counsel, and in the case of de-
fendant, his last known counsel, which notice provided 
in part as follows: 
" * * * This matter is set for a non-jury trial 
unless the jury fee has been paid heretofore. If 
a jury trial is desired, the statutory fee must be 
paid no later than ten days from the date of this 
letter, with notice thereof being served on oppos-
ing counsel. 
AJA:mts 
cc: Eldred J. Wilde 
Very truly yours, 
s/ Aldon J. Anderson 
Aldon J. Anderson 
Presiding Judge 
Courtroom No. 9 
5th Floor, Courts Building 
240 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
616 Judge Building" 
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\Yhether or not Mr. Wilde advised defendant of his 
receipt of the notice from the District Court is not 
known; however, the court acted properly in sending the 
noitce to Mr. Wilde since he was defendant's last known 
attorney and no notice had been sent to either plaintiffs 
or the court of the appearance of or the name and add-
ress of new counsel. 
Title 78-51-34, Utah Code Annotated, J953, provides 
as follows: 
''Change of attorney.-The attorney in any 
, ' action or special proceeding may be changed at 
. any time before judgment or final determination 
as follows: 
(1) Upon his own consent, filed with the clerk 
or entered upon the minutes. 
(2) * * * * * " 
. '1 _ The next following section of the Code, Title 78-51-v 3::>, states: 
'' Effect-Notice of change.-When an at-
torney is changed as provided in the next pre-
ceding section, written notice of the change and 
\ 
\ 
of the substitution of a new attorney or of the 
appearance of the party in person must be given 
to the adverse party; until then he must recognize 
the former attorney.'' 
Tlw record shows that Eldred Wilde, defendant's 
attnruey, voluntarily withdrew as counsel for Mr. Cor-
cloYa pursuant to 78-51-34(1), Utah Code Annotated, 
1053. :\fter his withdrawal and until Mr. Midgley ap-
peared as counsel for defendant, both the court and 
plaintiffs counsel were compelled to recognize Eldred 
10 
-Wilde as attorney for defendant pursuant to 78-51-35, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This was necessitated by 
the failure of defendant and Reserve Insurance Com-
pany to notify counsel or the court of the name and add-
ress of defendant's new lawyer. As a matter of fact, 
neither l\Ir. Cordova nor Reserve Insurance Company 
were interested enough to even bother about new counsel 
for defendant until sunrise of the trial day. 
In the case of Salina Canyon Coal Company v. 
Klemm, 76 Utah 372, 290 Pac. 161, the Utah Supreme 
Court held, on construing the provisions of 78-51-35, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that an attorney who has 
appeared for a party in a case may be treated as such 
by opposing counsel until opposing counsel are notified 
by the dismissal or change of attorneys. A Notice of 
Appeal served upon that shall be suf-
ficient notice to the opposite party. 
Title 78-51-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is not 
in point or controlling in this case since Mr. Cordova's 
attorney, Eldred Wilde, did not die, nor was he removed 
as counsel, nor was he suspended from the practice of 
H 1 :... law, nor did he cease to act as an attorney. e on y r' ... 
ceased to act as attorney for defendant while remaining , ... _.,..,r 
actiYely engaged in the practice of law. 
Our high court has also addressed itself to the prob-
lem of interpreting 78-51-36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. ) 
In the case of Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. West, 
'.20 U.2d 292, 437 P.2d 214, the court held that this par- ) 
ticular statute did not entitle defendant to have a de-
11 
.. 
fault judgment set aside which had been taken against 
him when his attorney withdrew even though plaintiff 
had not demanded that defendant get new counsel and 
there was nothing in the record to indicate that defen-
dant's withdrawing counsel had died, was removed or 
w<ls suspended from the practice of law. 
Plaiutiff s could not agree with defendant more 
when he states the law to the effect that where a demand 
for a jury trial is not timely made, it is in the sound 
discretion of the trial court as to whether a belated 
demand for a jury trial will be granted. Thompson L'. 
A11rlersoJ1, 107 Utah 331, 133 P.2d 665; Hunter c. 
Michaels, 11± Utah 242, 198 P.2d 245; TV ebb L'. TV ebb, 
116 rtah 115, 209 P.2d 201 ;Farmers and Merchants 
Bank 1·. C.l.T., 4 U.2d 210, 390 P.2d 127; 
Sweeney c. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 U.2d 113, 417 P.2d 126. 
Defendant, :l\Ir. Cordova, was not without counsel 
on the day that the Notice of Readiness for Trial was 
filed. :'.\Ir. Cordova knew that his counsel had withdrawn 
for he received a copy of the Notice of Withdrawal on 
Xovember 25, 1968, the same clay it was mailed to plain-
tiffs' counsel. Uncloubteclly, jfr. -Wilde advised clefe11-
clm1t of the X otice of Readiness that had been filed. 
X either j[r. Corclo\'a nor Reserve Insurance Company, 
his alter 0go, took any action to have new counsel ap-
p1Jintec1 for clefenclant until five days before the trial. 
Until then the court ancl counsel for plaintiffs recog-
nized Eldred \;fikle as defendant's attorney. 
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After sitting on their hands for some seven months, 
the insurance company breathlessly rushed into court 
on June 20, 1969, waving its legal arms shouting plati-
tudes about the right of defendant to a jury trial. It 
is interesting that the company had never shown so 
much interest before in the rights of Mr. Cordova and 
rYen before hiring :Mr. Midgley it reserved its rights 
under the Christensen policy giving it the right to 
recover against Cordova any amount the company 
is required to pay plaintiffs. 
This is a strange relationship indeed unless we 
realize that Reserve Insurance Company is not at all 
concerned about the rights of the uninsured defendant 
hut only with what result will ultimately affect its inner 
pocket. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT, BY RECEIPTING 
HIS 'S NOTICE OF WITH-
DRA vV AL, WAS NOT DEEMED TO BE AP-
PEARING PRO SE, AND FAILURE TO 
GIVE HIM NOTICE OF ALL SUBSEQUENT 
PROCEEDINGS WAS NOT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
In the interest of brevity, plaintiffs incorporate the 
applicable and relevant portions of Point II into Point 
1 TI of this brief. 
Defendant's point that after the withdrawal of his 
eounsel he was deemed to be appearing pro se and it 
was error to fail to personally give him notice of all 
13 
subsequent proceedings is not well taken. The law and 
discussion under Point II of this brief is cited and es-
pecially as that discussion relates to 78-51-34, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
But the gut issue in this case is not at all whether 
l\Ir. Cordova had notice of the trial setting but whether 
Reserve Insurance Company was aware of the status 
of the case at all times. Mr. Cordova never employed an 
attorney to represent him after Eldred Wilde withdrew 
as his counsel. He did not approach the insurance com-
pany and request that it obtain legal help to assist him 
in his defense of this case. The company contacted him, 
explained to defendant what it proposed to do and the 
greatest effort to which it could spur defendant was to 
merely ohtain his consent to having the insurance com-
pm1y 's attorney represent him. 
Surely Mr. Cordova was advised by the company 
that he would be protected from plaintiffs' claim and 
that it would employ their counsel to do it. However, 
the company, while assuring defendant that in the in-
terests of justice it would protect the downtrodden and 
the uninsured, especially if the company could be in-
jured in any way by its not doing so, and at the same · 
time reserved its right to collect from this same down-
tn 1dd0n and uninsured any amount that his savior should 
lian· to pay plaintiffs. 
The statements in Appellant's Brief to the con- ' 
trnry notwithstanding, we are confronted here, not with 
:\fr. Cordova, hut with Rc>serve Insurance Company who 
14 
was not responsible enough to reject the offers of settle-
ment solicited from plaintiffs' counsel or to make a 
counter-offer. 
One more interesting aspect of the case should be 
noted here. Appellant has made no issue with the amount 
of the judgment awarded plaintiffs and has therefore 
impliedly admitted that the amount awarded was rea-
.-;onahle-and so it 'vas. Other than having the case tried 
hy a jury, appellant makes no claim of any prejudicial 
error in the trial. Defendant does not contend that if 
the matter is remanded for a jury trial that the amount 
of damages will be less than awarded by the court. Cer-
tai11ly he could not hope to have eight just men and 
true pass on the liability of the case since counsel for the 
iwmrance company admitted liability at the trial. 
It is obvious that a new trial would achieve nothing 
1 mt a multiplicity of suits. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERRON-
PERMIT PLAINTIFF JAMES D. 
CHRISTENSEN ADD A CLAIM OF PER-
SON AL INJURIES AT THE TIME OF THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE TRIAL. 
Again it should be pointed out that we are here 
discussing Reserve Insurance Company and not Mr. 
( 'orclova. In this case, judgment has been entered against 
defendant but no effort has been made by plaintiffs to 
...:;1tisfy the judgment against him even though no super-
-;edeas boml has been filed in this matter. Plaintiffs have 
15 
an msnrance policy with Reserve Insurance Company 
whereby the company agrees to pay plaintiffs for dam-
ages caused to them by any uninsured motorist. Mr. Cor-
dova is uninsured. The amount of the judgment is with-
in the policy limits of the uninsured motorist coverage 
provided. How says, then, appellant that the company 
is not involved. It is attempting to disguise, hide and 
mingle its monetary interests with those of an uninsured 
and probably impecunious individual in order to gain 
sympathy for its dollar position. 
After plaintiffs' counsel filed the complaint setting 
forth the bodily injury claim of plaintiff Betty Christen-
sen and the property damage claim of plaintiff James 
D. Christensen, Mr. L. D. "\Vrigley, the company's ad-
juster, was notified of the bodily injury claim of Mr. 
Christensen. Copies of medical bills and reports on Mrs. 
Christensen were mailed to the adjuster. On behalf of 
the company, he demanded an independent medical ex-
amination on both plaintiffs by a doctor of the com-
pany's choosing. Twice the adjuster requested that of-
f0rs of settlement be made for the claims of both plain-
tiffs and twice offers were made. On neither occasion 
c1icl the off er generate a yea or nay from the Company. 
It is not kno-v\·n hy counsel for plaintiffs whether 
-:\Ir. Midgley was employed by L. D ... Wrigley, the ad-
juster, or directly by the company. In either event, he 
'rnnld have the company's file on the whole case which 
·w<mld r0vcal the contents of the adjuster's file. Ho\Y 
says appellant, then, that the claim for bodily injury of 
plaintiff James D. Christensen came as a bolt out of the 
blue so that the company's counsel was shocked into 
insensibility at the trial and was caused to stumble about 
the court room in wonder and amazement at the recent 
turn of events. 
Plaintiffs respectfully assert that the real party in 
interest in this case, Reserve Insurance Company, was 
well aware of the bodily injury claim of Mr. Christensen 
and certainly well knew that such a claim would be 
asserted at the trial and that because of its course of 
rondurt with plaintiffs' counsel, waived its right to re-
sist the presentation of said claim at that time and is 
Pstopped from so resisting it. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts, authorities and ar-
gument, plaintiffs urge the Court to affirm the judg-
ment of the trial court and award plaintiffs their costs 
expended on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, ESQ. 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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